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Heng Xu* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the booming popularity of Online Social Networks 
(“OSNs”), a tremendous number of users share personal informa-
tion, activities, opinions, photos, and videos on OSNs, which is giving 
rise to growing privacy concerns among various stakeholders, includ-
ing providers of OSNs, marketers, and other users on the social net-
working sites.  OSNs brought the voluntary disclosure of personal da-
ta to the mainstream, thus exposing users’ published information 
with potential abuse.1  Privacy concerns pertain to the acquisition of 
personal data and the potential risks that users may experience over 
the possible privacy breaches.2  At the same time, despite the pres-
ence of some privacy norms and regulations, there are relatively few 
well-established institutional rules and contracts governing OSNs, 
which gives rise to opportunism. 
An additional dimension that represents the complexity of study-
ing privacy risks in the context of OSNs is added by the highly dynam-
ic social interactions with rich data exchange.  Users are actively 
creating content that not only reveals their own identities but also 
connects with their “friends” (e.g., tagging a friend in an image or 
linking to a friend’s personal profile in a wall post).  Such interper-
sonal nature of data sharing activities raises some new privacy chal-
lenges because users and their social ties share responsibilities for 
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 1 See Spencer Kelly, Identity ‘at Risk’ on Facebook, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/7375772.stm (explaining how 
seemingly innocuous Facebook applications can collect personal user details without the 
user knowing). 
 2 See Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratifi-
cation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2004), 
available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacy-gratification.pdf (dis-
cussing common online consumer privacy concerns). 
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keeping their shared data safe and private.  Even if some users think 
they have tight privacy settings, their personal information could be 
accessed or misused by unauthorized parties due to their friends’ ig-
norance of privacy and security.3  The need for collective privacy 
management arises due to the inability to monitor others on the net-
work and uncertainty about their behaviors. 
To address the acute concerns for collective information privacy 
in the context of OSNs, this Article aims to add to the growing priva-
cy literature by exploring conceptual underpinnings of privacy in the 
context of OSNs, identifying privacy management strategies, and dis-
cussing major drivers and impediments of information disclosure.  
This Article contributes to existing privacy research in several impor-
tant ways.  First, rather than drawing on a single theoretical lens, I try 
to build upon previous literature from multiple theoretical lenses to 
create a common understanding of individuals’ information disclo-
sure or withholding behavior in the context of OSNs.  The synthesis 
of privacy literature, bounded rationality theory, control agency 
theory, and social contract theory may provide a rich understanding 
of the major drivers and impediments of information disclosure in 
the context of OSNs. 
Second, although several studies have reported growing privacy 
concerns,4 recent research has identified the phenomenon of “priva-
cy paradox” that individuals express privacy worries but behave in 
ways that contradict their statements.5  In the context of OSNs, such a 
privacy attitude/behavior dichotomy is more apparent.  While “inva-
 
 3 Na Wang et al., Third-Party Apps on Facebook:  Privacy and the Illusion of Control, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH ACM SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTER HUMAN INTERACTION FOR 
MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (2011), available at http://people.ischool.b
erkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags-CHIMIT11.pdf (“If the user is not dili-
gent about setting secure privacy settings, the apps may be able to access his/her friends’ 
information.  This is especially unfair for his/her friends who may be proactive and try to 
make smart privacy choices.”). 
 4 Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities:  Awareness, Information Sharing, 
and Privacy on the Facebook, PET (2006), available at http://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy
/projects/facebook/facebook2.pdf (citing “privacy policy” as a “highly important issue in 
the public debate by our respondents” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Christopher 
M. Hoadley et al., Privacy as Information Access and Illusory Control:  The Case of the Facebook 
News Feed Privacy Outcry, 9 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 50, 55 (2010) (discuss-
ing users’ perceptions that easier access to information leads to a decrease in one’s con-
trol over personal information). 
 5 Acquisti, supra note 2, at 1 (“Even privacy concerned individuals are willing to trade-off 
privacy for convenience, or bargain the release of very personal information in exchange 
for relatively small rewards.”); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rational-
ity in Individual Decision Making, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, 29 (“[R]ecent 
surveys, anecdotal evidence, and experiments have highlighted an apparent dichotomy 
between privacy attitudes and actual behavior.”). 
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sion of privacy” shockwaves flood the headlines of newspapers, alle-
gedly “angry users” are still uploading their work histories to Linke-
dIn, or their photos to Flickr, or updating their relationship statuses 
to Facebook, choosing to connect their online identities with these 
key pieces of personal information.  This Article contributes to this 
controversial issue by addressing the inconsistencies in individual pri-
vacy decisions from the bounded rationality and optimistic bias theo-
retical perspectives. 
In what follows, the Article begins with a discussion of the concep-
tual underpinnings of privacy in the context of OSNs.  Next, the con-
trol agency theory in the psychology literature is applied in order to 
identify privacy management strategies.  The impacts of trust in OSNs 
providers and trust in social ties are also examined.  Important post-
ulates from theories in bounded rationality, optimistic bias, control 
agency, and social contract are synthesized into a theoretical frame-
work.  The Article concludes with a discussion of theoretical and 
practical implications. 
II.  PRIVACY:  A MULTIFACETED CONCEPT 
Various definitions of privacy have been given in the literature.  
The conceptualizations of privacy range from a “right to be let alone” 
in law,6 to a “state of limited access” in philosophy,7 to the control 
over information about one’s self in social sciences.8  Such a variety of 
conceptualizations of privacy leads Solove to note that privacy is “in 
disarray,” and “[n]obody can articulate what it means.”9  Numerous 
efforts have been devoted by privacy scholars to develop a consistent 
conceptualization of privacy and bring together the different pers-
pectives.10 
 
 6 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Ferdinand David Schoeman, Preface to PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:  AN 
ANTHOLOGY 3 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
 8 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
 9 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (2006). 
 10 See generally Giovanni Iachello & Jason Hong, End-User Privacy in Human-Computer Interac-
tion, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 1–137 (2007), available at 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jasonh/publications/fnt-end-user-privacy-in-human-computer-
interaction-final.pdf (summarizing research on privacy in Human-Computer Interaction 
and charting future research trends while noting areas that are “timely but lagging”); 
Clinton D. Lanier, Jr. & Amit Saini, Understanding Consumer Privacy:  A Review and Future 
Directions, 12 ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI. REV., no. 2, 2008, at 1–48, available at 
http://www.kommunikationsforum.dk/Profiler/ProfileFolders/Kkort/Understanding.p
df (providing a general understanding on the concept of privacy while reviewing litera-
ture on consumer privacy and suggesting future research directions that will expand the 
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The prior body of conceptual exploration has led to welcome ef-
forts to synthesize various perspectives and identify common ground.  
Toward this end, Solove describes privacy as “a shorthand umbrella 
term” for a related web of privacy problems resulting from informa-
tion collection, processing, dissemination, and invasion activities.11  
He discusses what conditions reduce privacy by developing a tax-
onomy of information processing and dissemination activities, which 
maps out various types of problems and harms that constitute privacy 
violations.  Solove’s groundwork for a pluralistic conception of priva-
cy differentiates the concept of privacy (as an individual state) from 
the management of privacy (arising from organizational information 
processing activities).12  In this Article, rather than drawing on a mo-
nolithic concept of privacy from a single theoretical lens, I attempt to 
integrate multiple theoretical lenses to develop a common under-
standing of information privacy in the context of OSNs. 
A.  Privacy as Control vs. Privacy as Restricted Access 
Relating information privacy to the control of personal informa-
tion is an important perspective found in prior literature, which has 
contributed to and stimulated research on privacy as a control-related 
concept.13  Wolfe and Laufer suggested that “[t]he need and ability to 
exert control over self, objects, spaces, information and behavior is 
 
current understanding); H. Jeff Smith, Tamara Dinev & Heng Xu, Information Privacy Re-
search:  An Interdisciplinary Review, 35 MIS Q. 989–1015 (2011), available at 
http://pal.ist.psu.edu/MISQ.pdf (providing an “interdisciplinary review of privacy-
related research in order to enable a more cohesive treatment”). 
 11 Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760 (2007). 
 12 Id. at 754–60. 
 13 See, e.g., Irwin Altman, Privacy Regulation:  Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?, 33 J. 
SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1977, at 66, 67 (discussing Altman’s “conceptualization of privacy as 
the selective control of access to the self”); Carl Anderson Johnson, Privacy as Personal 
Control (1), in 2 MAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS:  EVALUATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 83 
(Daniel H. Carson ed., 1974) (observing that many behavioral scientists recognize that 
personal control is central to “[a]ny adequate conceptualization of privacy”); Robert S. 
Laufer et al., Some Analytic Dimensions of Privacy, in ARCHITECTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 353, 360–
61 (Rikard Küller ed., 1973) (describing control as “a critical element in any conception 
of privacy,” and explaining that “[t]here are at least three aspects of control which are re-
lated to privacy:  control over choice, control over access, and control over stimulation” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also WESTIN, supra note 8, at 7 (defining privacy 
as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”). 
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[a] critical” element in any concept of privacy.14  This view of control 
in justifying the concept of privacy is also found in a number of con-
sumer privacy studies.15  For instance, consumers perceive informa-
tion disclosure as less privacy-invasive when they believe that they will 
be able “to control future use of the information.”16  This stream of 
privacy literature indicates that control should be one of the key fac-
tors that “provides the greatest degree of explanation for privacy con-
cern[s].”17 
While control has received attention as the common core of defi-
nitions of privacy, researchers in philosophy and some branches of 
social science have noted that it is important to distinguish the con-
cept of privacy from the notion of control.18  “According to DeCew, 
 
 14 Maxine Wolfe & Robert Laufer, The Concept of Privacy in Childhood and Adolescence, in 2 
MAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS:  EVALUATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 29, 31 (Daniel H. 
Carson ed., 1974). 
 15 See, e.g., Cathy Goodwin, Privacy:  Recognition of a Consumer Right, J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING, Spring 1991, at 149, 149–50 (explaining that “consumer privacy concerns 
two dimensions,” both of which are related to control, and that “control has been in-
cluded in definitions of privacy offered by” researchers in many fields); Glen J. Nowak & 
Joseph Phelps, Direct Marketing and the Use of Individual-Level Consumer Information:  Deter-
mining How and When “Privacy” Matters, J. DIRECT MARKETING Fall 1997, at 94, 96–97 (ob-
serving that “the evolution of the privacy construct suggests that there are at least three 
conceptualizations that have considerable relevance for direct marketers’ consumer in-
formation practices,” and recognizing that control at least plays a role in the second); Jo-
seph Phelps et al., Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 
19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 27, 28–29 (2000) (explaining that privacy “encompasses at 
least four different dimensions,” all of which connect with “information control”); Kim 
Bartel Sheehan & Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Dimensions of Privacy Concern Among Online Consum-
ers, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING. 62, 63 (2000) (explaining that the “predominant in-
fluences on the degree to which consumers experience privacy concern” both involve 
control). 
 16 Mary J. Culnan & Pamela K. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural Fairness, 
and Impersonal Trust:  An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG. SCI. 104, 106 (1999) (explaining 
when “individuals are less likely to perceive information collection procedures as privacy-
invasive”). 
 17 Sheehan & Hoy, supra note 15, at 69. 
18 See, e.g., Stephen T. Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories 
of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 424 (2003) (noting that “[e]ven though control is fea-
tured in many privacy theories, few have systematically integrated the control literature 
into their theories”); Stephen T. Margulis, Privacy as a Social Issue and Behavioral Con-
cept, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 243, 245 (2003) (observing that an earlier definition of privacy Mar-
guils offered, which involved “control over transactions,” failed to distinguish between the 
various types of transactions—transactions limiting access to self, to groups, or to organi-
zations); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1153–55 (2002) 
(concluding that “[t]he conception of privacy as control over information only partially 
captures the problem” created by the collection and use of personal information, and ar-
guing for a “bottom-up” conceptualization of privacy); Herman T. Tavani, Philosophical 
Theories of Privacy:  Implications for an Adequate Online Privacy Policy, 38 METAPHIL. 1, 2 
1082 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
we often lose control over information in ways that do not involve an 
invasion of our privacy.”19  Following such perspective, Waldo et al. 
argue that “control over information cannot be the exclusive defining 
characteristic of privacy,” and privacy is more than control.20  Such 
limitation in the conceptualization of privacy as control spurred the 
formulation of a modified notion of privacy as restricted access, which 
conceptualizes privacy as “[a] condition of limited access to identifia-
ble information about individuals.”21  Tavani and Moor state that 
“[t]he concept of privacy itself is best defined in terms of restricted 
access, not control.”22 
In this Article, I argue that neither control nor restricted access 
perspectives alone can justify the concept of privacy in OSNs.  In-
stead, privacy is a multifaceted concept that should be analyzed with 
the following considerations:  i) degree of control over information 
release, and ii) degree of ease of information access by others.  The 
event of the Facebook News Feed privacy outcry provided preliminary 
support for such distinction between perceived control over informa-
tion release and perceived ease of access:  although the Facebook’s 
old (without the News Feed features) and new (with the News Feed 
features) “interfaces are isomorphic in terms of actual control over” 
information release and dissemination, “[t]he introduction of the 
News Feed . . . enhances the ease of access” to shared data.23  Hence, 
it “increases the perceived probability that those data will be accessed 
by more audiences, which in turn leads to a lower control perception 
over personal information.”24 
The theoretical distinction between control over information release 
and ease of information access seems readily understood.  However, 
 
(2007) (organizing the “classic . . . philosophical and legal theories of privacy . . . into 
four broad categories,” only one of which explicitly involves control). 
 19 See Solove, supra note 18, at 1114 (citing JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY:  
LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 53 (1997)). 
 20 See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, ENGAGING PRIVACY AND INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 61 (James Waldo et al. eds., 2007).  Waldo et al. explain 
why the notion of “privacy as control” is misleading by presenting a situation where a per-
son chose “to reveal intimate details of his life on national television.”  Id.  Based on the 
notion of “privacy as control,” such a person could not claim that a privacy violation has 
occurred in such a situation (because the person chose to reveal those details).  Id.  But 
our intuitions would say that this person had less privacy, under a “‘privacy as restricted 
access’ theory.”  Id. 
 21 H. Jeff Smith, Privacy Policies and Practices:  Inside the Organizational Maze, COMMS. ACM, 
Dec. 1993, at 104, 106. 
 22 Herman T. Tavani & James H. Moor, Privacy Protection, Control of Information and Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies, COMPUTERS & SOC’Y, Mar. 2001, at 6. 
 23 See Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 57. 
 24 Id. 
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most users in everyday practice may conflate these two dimensions by 
having an “illusion” of control over the information they reveal:  since 
they have control over the information release, they believe they also 
have control over others’ access to that information.25  In this Article, 
I argue that such “illusion” of control could be explained by the opti-
mistic bias where users overestimate their control over information re-
lease and meanwhile underestimate the future invisible access to 
their revealed information by others.26  To provide a richer concep-
tual description of privacy, this Article demonstrates the theoretical 
contribution of the optimistic bias to the understanding of privacy. 
B.  Role of Optimistic Bias 
The above two perspectives (privacy as control vs. privacy as re-
stricted access) complement each other and reveal different but in-
terrelated approaches to conceptualizing privacy.  When looking 
across these different aspects, I propose that an individual’s perceived 
privacy in the context of OSNs is better viewed as a multifaceted con-
cept that is analyzed with the following considerations: 
i) the extent to which users can control the disclosure and disse-
mination of their personal information (perceived control over in-
formation release), 
ii) the degree of ease with which their online profiles and their 
personal information are visible and exposed to others (perceived 
ease of information access), and 
iii) the subjective estimation of control over their information re-
lease as well as the future access to their revealed information by oth-
ers (optimistic bias). 
People tend to assign a higher probability for an event with a posi-
tive outcome but assign a lower probability for an event with an unfa-
vorable outcome.  This phenomenon has been variously referred to 
as unrealistic optimism27 or optimistic bias28 or self-favoring bias.29  Research 
 
 25 See Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences:  Privacy and the Control Paradox, NINTH 
WORKSHOP ON ECON. INFO. SECURITY, June 2010, at 1–3 (explaining that their results 
show that individuals have a false sense of control over others’ access to their information 
when they have control over the publication of their personal information). 
 26 See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism:  Present and Future, 15 J. 
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1996) (defining optimistic bias as the tendency to unde-
restimate the “likelihood . . . of experiencing negative events”). 
 27 See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (describing this phenomenon as “unrealistic optimism”). 
 28 See Weinstein & Klein, supra note 26, at 2 (describing this phenomenon alternatively as 
“optimistic bias” or “unrealistic optimism”). 
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has shown that individuals demonstrate this optimistic bias when cal-
culating their vulnerability to unfavorable events in various domains 
such as getting in a car accident30 or being mugged31 or being in-
volved in unhealthy behavior.32  Because measures for estimating the 
likelihood of an event occurring in the future are not easily obtaina-
ble,33 individuals tend to use a comparative likelihood to evaluate 
their positions and abilities (e.g., using a peer as comparison target) 
instead of calculating actual likelihood.34  With this social comparison 
process, individuals aim at finding out whether people perceive their 
risk lower or higher than others’ risk, rather than the actual risk.  I 
believe that similar optimistic bias exists in an individual’s perception 
of privacy vulnerability associated with OSNs.  As privacy risks are 
highly subjective and difficult to quantify, users are likely to evaluate 
their privacy risks by engaging in social comparison process.  There-
fore, I argue that users on OSNs tend to believe that their privacy 
risks are lower than that of peers. 
In identifying factors that influence optimistic bias in risk percep-
tion, researchers have suggested the role of perceived control in in-
fluencing the extent of optimistic bias.  Perceived control refers to 
the extent to which a person believes he is capable of “producing de-
sired and preventing undesired events.”35  Similar to risk perception, 
 
 29 See Vera Hoorens, Self-Favoring Biases for Positive and Negative Characteristics:  Independent 
Phenomena?, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (1996) (observing that this phenome-
non is “one of a wide variety of self-favoring biases in social comparison”). 
 30 See Frank P. McKenna, It Won’t Happen to Me:  Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?, 84 
BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 39, 39–41 (1993) (describing research that has found that people 
underestimate the risk of getting in a car accident in part because people believe them-
selves to be better-than-average drivers). 
 31 See Linda S. Perloff & Barbara K. Fetzer, Self-Other Judgments and Perceived Vulnerability to 
Victimization, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 502, 503–04 (1986) (describing the re-
sults of their study demonstrating the tendency of individuals to underestimate the like-
lihood of being mugged). 
 32 See Hoorens, supra note 29, at 62–63 (describing results of a study demonstrating individ-
uals’ tendency to overestimate their likelihood of engaging in healthy behaviors and to 
underestimate their likelihood of engaging in unhealthy behaviors, relative to an average 
student). 
 33 See Alexander J. Rothman et al., Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk, 
26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1213, 1214 (1996) (observing that risk statistics are “hard to 
locate” especially for population subgroups). 
 34 See Perloff & Fetzer, supra note 31, at 502–03 (observing the tendency of individuals to 
engage in social comparisons with an average person or peers when estimating the like-
lihood that a negative life event will occur to them). 
 35 See ELLEN A. SKINNER, PERCEIVED CONTROL, MOTIVATION, AND COPING 8 (1995) (explain-
ing that perceived control can be understood as a need for competence, meaning the 
ability to control events). 
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studies have also found a self-serving tendency in personal control 
perception, which is called “illusion of control.”36 
This illusion of control is documented in various situations.  For 
instance, in daily driving, Svenson found that approximately 80% of 
drivers among the study participants believe their driving ability is 
better than average.37  Accordingly, I argue that such optimistic bias 
exists in one’s perception of information control and information 
access on OSNs:  users tend to perceive themselves to have a higher 
degree of control over information release and a lower degree of in-
formation access than their peers do. 
A number of studies have supported the linkage between per-
ceived control and risk perception:  on one hand, people show high-
er comparative optimism and less concern when they believe they can 
exercise control over potential threats.38  On the other hand, people 
perceive themselves as highly vulnerable to dangers when they believe 
themselves as lacking coping mechanisms.39  Regarding various priva-
cy threats, if people have a higher level of control beliefs in their in-
formation release and in their ability to avoid the potential informa-
tion access and misuse, then it is reasonable to argue that privacy risk 
perceptions would be adjusted downward.  Furthermore, it appears 
reasonable to argue that if a person’s judgment on his or her ability 
to control privacy threats is exaggerated, this illusion of control 
would account for the optimistic bias in his or her risk perception.  
Thus I argue that the theory of optimistic bias suggests the self-
serving tendency in control perception:  as individuals’ perceived 
control over their personal information increases, they demonstrate a 
greater extent of optimistic bias in privacy risk perception.  Similarly, 
the theory of optimistic bias also suggests the self-serving tendency in 
perceived ease of information access:  as users’ perceptions of others’ 
 
 36 See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 327 
(1975) (studying the phenomenon of control illusion and concluding that when certain 
factors were present, individuals were overly confident and more willing to take risks). 
 37 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981). 
 38 Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?:  The Relationship Between Perceived Controllabili-
ty and Optimistic Bias, 15 J. SOC. & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 9, 11–12 (1996) (suggesting that per-
ceived controllability and optimistic bias are associated); Cynthia T.F. Klein & Marie Hel-
weg-Larsen, Perceived Control and the Optimistic Bias:  A Meta-Analytic Review, 17 PSYCHOL. & 
HEALTH 437, 437–38 (2002) (investigating the linkage between perceived control associa-
tion and optimistic bias by looking at twenty research studies). 
 39 Elizabeth M. Ozer & Albert Bandura, Mechanisms Governing Empowerment Effects:  A Self-
Efficacy Analysis, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 472, 472–73 (1990) (investigating the 
psychology of increased personal empowerment through a study of women enrolled in 
community self-defense programs). 
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access to their revealed information decrease, they demonstrate a 
greater extent of optimistic bias in privacy risk perceptions. 
III.  PRIVACY DECISION MAKING:  RATIONAL CHOICE VS. BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY 
A.  Privacy Calculus 
Within the robust body of research that attempts to understand 
individual privacy decision making, it has been found that the calculus 
perspective (i.e., economic cost-benefit analysis) of information ex-
change is “the most useful framework for analyzing contemporary 
consumer privacy concerns.”40  This perspective reflects an implicit 
understanding that privacy can be interpreted in “economic terms.”41  
That is to say, “individuals should be willing to disclose personal in-
formation in exchange for some economic or social benefit subject to 
an assessment that their personal information will be subsequently 
used fairly and they will not suffer negative consequences in the fu-
ture.”42  This calculus perspective of information exchange is especial-
ly apparent in recent research analyzing consumer privacy concerns.43  
That is to say, consumers often calculate the value of the benefit be-
ing offered in exchange for their personal information in the deci-
sion making process of an information disclosure.44 
 
 40 Mary J. Culnan & Robert J. Bies, Consumer Privacy:  Balancing Economic and Justice Considera-
tions, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 323, 326 (2003). 
 41 Peter H. Klopfer & Daniel I. Rubenstein, The Concept Privacy and Its Biological Basis, 33 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 52, 64 (1977) (discussing the degree to which privacy can be considered in 
terms of cost/benefit analysis). 
 42 Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 326–27. 
 43 Id. at 327; Mary J. Culnan & Pamela K. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural 
Fairness, and Impersonal Trust:  An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG. SCI. 104, 104, 106 (1999) 
(hypothesizing that consumers will be more willing to disclose personal information to be 
used for marketing when their concerns about privacy are addressed by fair procedures); 
Han Li et al., Understanding Situational Online Information Disclosure as a Privacy Calculus, 51 
J. COMPUTER INFO. SYS., Fall 2010, at 62 (testing how an individual’s decision making on 
information disclosure is driven by competing situational benefits and risk factors). 
 44 Mary J. Culnan, “How Did They Get My Name?”:  An Exploratory Investigation of Consumer Atti-
tudes Toward Secondary Information Use, MIS Q., Sept. 1993, at 341, 344–45, 356 (measuring 
reactions towards use of personal information based on relative degrees of sensitivity to 
privacy); Cathy Goodwin, Privacy:  Recognition of a Consumer Right, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y & 
MARKETING 149, 158, 161 (1991) (discussing willingness of consumers to disclose infor-
mation for research purposes based on what they will receive in return); George R. Milne 
& Mary Ellen Gordon, Direct Mail Privacy-Efficiency Trade-Offs Within an Implied Social Con-
tract Framework, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 206, 206–07 (1993) (examining transac-
tions in which consumers provide information about themselves in exchange for offers 
that may be of interest to them); Kim Bartel Sheehan & Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Dimensions of 
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Coherent with the essential ideas of the privacy calculus, the ra-
tional choice theory may further explain how individuals make deci-
sions on information disclosure.45  This theory suggests that individu-
als calculate the likely costs and benefits of any engagement before 
making a decision.46  Individuals tend to pursue outcomes that max-
imize positive valences, which can be directly enhanced by benefits 
provided, and minimize negative valences.47  Along the line of ration-
al choice theory, a higher level of privacy concerns that are viewed as 
negative valences would be expected to negatively influence an indi-
vidual’s privacy decision making and subsequent information disclo-
sure behavior. 
B.  Bounded Rationality 
Although such a rational choice approach of analyzing privacy 
calculus has an intuitive appeal, recent studies have pointed out that 
users’ actual privacy behaviors often fail to display the rational trade-
off that the privacy calculus model would suggest.48  For example, 
through an experimental study, Berendt et al. demonstrated that us-
ers do not always act in line with their stated privacy preferences, giv-
ing away information about themselves without any compelling rea-
son to do so.49 
Acquisti and his colleagues have elaborated on this phenomenon 
of privacy paradox and argued that the dichotomy between privacy 
attitude and behavior is due to bounded rationality.50  Because of the 
 
Privacy Concern Among Online Consumers, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 62, 63–64 (2000) 
(exploring influences on consumer privacy concerns). 
 45 JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR ch. I (2d ed. 1947). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 327; Eugene Stone & Dianna L. Stone, Privacy in Organi-
zations:  Theoretical Issues, Research Findings, and Protection Mechanisms, 8 RES. PERSONNEL & 
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 349 (1990). 
 48 Carlos Jensen et al., Privacy Practices of Internet Users:  Self-Reports Versus Observed Behavior, 63 
INT’L J.HUM.-COMPUTER STUDS. 203, 226 (2005) (discussing how frequently and signifi-
cantly the rational-choice model fails in the privacy context); Patricia A. Norberg et al., 
The Privacy Paradox:  Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. 
CONSUMER AFF. 100, 101, 113, 116 (2007) (investigating the extent to which people in-
tend to disclose and actually disclose personal details during marketing exchanges). 
 49 Bettina Berendt et al., Privacy in E-Commerce:  Stated Preferences vs. Actual Behavior, COMM. 
ACM, Apr. 2005, at 101, 102 (“Findings suggest that, given the right circumstances, on-
line users easily forget about their privacy concerns and communicate even the most per-
sonal details without any compelling reason to do so.”). 
 50 See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 3 (“[B]ounded rationality refers to the inability to calculate 
and compare the magnitudes of payoffs associated with various strategies the individual 
may choose in privacy-sensitive situations.  It also refers to the inability to process all the 
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potential impacts of information processing capacity limitations and 
psychological distortions on individual decision making, human 
agents are unable to have absolute rationality.51  As pointed out by 
Acquisti, the economic literature implies inconsistency of personal 
preference over time—future events may be discounted at different 
discount rates than near-term events.52  Therefore, bounded rationali-
ty may affect privacy decisions:  the benefits of disclosing personal in-
formation may be immediate (e.g., ease of contacting friends), but 
the risk of such information disclosure may be invisible or spread 
over future periods of time (e.g., identity theft).53  Individuals may 
genuinely want to protect their information privacy, but because of 
bounded rationality, they may opt for immediate benefits of informa-
tion disclosure, rather than carefully calculating long-term risks of in-
formation disclosure.54 
Based on the above theoretical and empirical evidence, I argue 
that an individual’s privacy decision making in the context of OSNs 
should encompass the notion of bounded rationality that captures 
the difference between knowing a privacy threat and acting on the pri-
vacy threat.  Therefore, with the availability of immediate benefits in 
terms of self-presentation, relationship maintenance, extending social 
circles, and increasing popularity on OSNs, users are very likely to opt 
 
stochastic information related to risks and probabilities of events leading to privacy costs 
and benefits.”); Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 5, at 26 (“The individual decision 
process with respect to privacy is affected and hampered by multiple factors.  Among 
those, incomplete information, bounded rationality, and systemic psychological devia-
tions from rationality suggest that the assumption of perfect rationality might not ade-
quately capture the nuances of an individual’s privacy-sensitive behavior.”). 
 51 See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, 1 MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY, at xx (1984) (col-
lecting the author’s various essays on “economic subjects” which, he notes, are “sensitive 
to the limits of human rationality . . . [t]hat the concept of bounded rationality enters 
early in these essays should occasion no surprise”). 
 52 See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 4 (“[I]ndividuals have a tendency to discount ‘hyperbolically’ 
future costs or benefits.  In economics, hyperbolic discounting implies inconsistency of 
personal preferences over time—future events may be discounted at different discount 
rates than near-term events.” (footnote omitted)). 
 53 Id.  (“Hyperbolic discounting may affect privacy decisions, for instance when we heavily 
discount the (low) probability of (high) future risks such as identity theft.”); Acquisti & 
Grossklags, supra note 5, at 31 (“Discounting might also affect privacy behavior . . . . If in-
dividuals have time inconsistencies . . . they might easily fall for marketing offers that of-
fer low rewards now and a possibly permanent negative annuity in the future.  Moreover, 
although they might suffer in every future time period from their earlier mistake, they 
might decide against incurring the immediate cost of adopting a privacy technolo-
gy . . . even when they originally planned to.”). 
 54 See Acquisti, supra note 2, at 4 (“[P]eople may genuinely want to protect themselves, but 
because of self-control bias, they will not actually take those steps, and opt for immediate 
gratification instead.”). 
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for instant gratification by discounting the potential risks of informa-
tion disclosure. 
IV.  PRIVACY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
In the privacy literature, privacy control mechanism has been 
mainly understood as the individual choice to opt-in or opt-out from 
firms’ data collection activities,55 or as the ability to decide how one’s 
information is collected, used, and shared.56  This body of literature’s 
focus on individual privacy management, however, makes it too nar-
row, for it excludes those aspects of privacy management that are 
beyond individual choice.  Schwartz questions whether individuals 
are able to employ meaningful information control in all circums-
tances, given discrepancies in knowledge and power in the process of 
data gathering and transfer.57  The implication is that privacy man-
agement is not just a matter for the exercise of individual control but 
also an aspect of engineering innovation, group structure, organiza-
tional commitment, and social controls (e.g., legislation, regulation, 
and codes of conduct by professional associations).58 
To provide a richer conceptual description, I apply the control 
agency theory in the psychology literature to the understanding of 
privacy management strategies.  In particular, the control agency 
theory allows us to not only examine the effects of personal control, in 
which the self acts as the control agent to manage privacy, but also 
include collective control in which a social group acts as the control 
agent to manage privacy, as well as proxy control in which powerful 
 
 55 See generally Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer Online Privacy:  Legal and Ethical 
Issues, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 7–19 (2000) (discussing privacy control on the In-
ternet, especially regarding the choice to opt-in or out of control mechanisms). 
 56 See Naresh K. Malhotra et al., Internet Users’ Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC):  The Con-
struct, the Scale, and a Causal Model, 15 INFO. SYS. RES. 336, 338 (2004) (“[A] firm’s collection 
of personally identifiable information is perceived to be fair only when the consumer is 
granted control over the information and the consumer is informed about the firm’s in-
tended use of the information.”). 
 57 See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1612 (1999) (arguing that “the lack of knowledge about personal data use allows the cap-
ture of information that might never be generated if individuals had a better sense of the 
Internet’s data privacy zones”). 
 58 See George Duncan, Privacy by Design, 317 SCI. 1178, 1178 (2007) (“To help balance priva-
cy concerns and the need for personal data, a new paradigm is emerging, in which system 
designers conduct privacy risk assessments and incorporate privacy as a fundamental de-
sign parameter.”). 
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others (such as government and industry regulators) act as the con-
trol agent to protect privacy.59 
Three paths to protecting privacy can be identified from the con-
trol agency theory, which differentiates three types of privacy man-
agement strategies.  First, perceived control can be raised by having 
personal control, where the agent of control is the individual.60  Per-
sonal agency suggests that individuals are motivated to act upon op-
portunities that allow them to be the sole initiator of their behavior.61  
The second type of control is collective control, in which individual 
attempts to control the environment as a member of a group or col-
lective.62  In collective control, responsibility and agency will be dif-
fused among all actors.63 
Third, perceived control can be amplified by having proxy control, 
where the agent of control is powerful others.64  In proxy agency, 
“people try by one means or another to get those who have access to 
resources or expertise or who wield influence and power to act at 
their behest to secure the outcomes they desire.”65 
The privacy literature describes three major approaches to help 
protect privacy:  individual self-protection, collective privacy protec-
tion, and social controls through regulation and codes of conduct by 
 
 59 See Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory:  An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 
13 (2001) (“Social cognitive theory distinguishes among three different modes of human 
agency:  personal, proxy, and collective.”); see also Susumu Yamaguchi, Culture and Control 
Orientations, in THE HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 223 (David Matsumoto ed., 
2001) (discussing the distinctions between “personal control,” “proxy control,” and “col-
lective control”). 
 60 See Bandura, supra note 59, at 10 (“Perceived self-efficacy occupies a pivotal role in the 
causal structure of social cognitive theory because efficacy beliefs affect adaptation and 
chance not only in their own right, but through their impact on other determinants.” (ci-
tations omitted)); see also Ellen A. Skinner, A Guide to Constructs of Control, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 549, 558 (1996) (discussing the relationship between per-
sonal and perceived control). 
 61 See Bandura, supra note 59, at 6 (“[T]he power to originate actions for given purposes is 
the key feature of personal agency.”). 
 62 See Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 230 (“In collective control, one attempts to control the en-
vironment as a member of a group or collective, which serves as an agent of control.”). 
 63 See Bibb Latané et. al., Many Hands Make Light the Work:  The Causes and Consequences of 
Social Loafing, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 822, 823 (1979) (“Social impact theory 
holds that when a person stands as a target of social forces coming from . . . outside the 
group, the impact of these forces on any given member should diminish in inverse pro-
portion to the strength, immediacy, and number of group members.  Impact is divided 
up among the group members, in much the same way that responsibility for helping 
seems to be divided among witnesses to an emergency.” (citations omitted)). 
 64 See Bandura, supra note 59, at 13 (discussing proxy control generally); Yamaguchi, supra 
note 59, at 228–30 (“Proxy control means control by someone else for the benefit of the 
person.”). 
 65 Bandura, supra note 59, at 13. 
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professional associations.66  Below I argue that these approaches fall 
into three generic categories based on the type of control agency they 
provide. 
A.  Individual Privacy Management 
The first control-enhancing mechanism comprises tools and ap-
proaches that allow individuals to protect their information privacy by 
directly controlling the flow of their personal information to others.  
Individual privacy management is often viewed as a dynamic boun-
dary regulation process, where individuals attempt to balance the pri-
vacy-publicity tradeoff among many different genres of information 
disclosure in order to assume the proper identity for a given au-
dience.67  The agent of control in individual privacy management is 
the self, and the effects of this mechanism arise due to the opportuni-
ty for personal control.  When individuals exercise personal control 
through individual self-protection actions, they are striving for “pri-
mary control” over their environment.68  Such a mechanism empow-
ers individuals with primary control over how their personal informa-
tion may be gathered by merchants and service providers. 
In the context of OSNs, prior research describes two types of indi-
vidual privacy management:  behavioral self-protection and technolo-
gical self-protection.69  An array of behavioral self-protection ap-
proaches has been discussed in terms of choosing a private commu-
communication channel (e.g., private messages instead of wall posts 
on Facebook), using deliberate wordings and tones in (semi) public 
 
 66 H. Jeff Smith et al., Information Privacy Research:  An Interdisciplinary Review, 35 MIS Q. 989, 
1000–01, 1007 (2011) (discussing the relative merits of each approach to privacy protec-
tion). 
 67 See Mark S. Ackerman & Lorrie Cranor, Privacy Critics:  UI Components to Safeguard Users’ 
Privacy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 258, 258–59 (1999) (discussing privacy as “an information in-
terface problem”); Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS (CHI) 129, 131–32, 135 (2003) (discussing the “disclosure boundary” between 
“privacy and publicity” and the “identity boundary” between “self and other”). 
 68 John R. Weisz et al., Standing Out and Standing In:  The Psychology of Control in America and 
Japan, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 955, 955–56 (1984) (discussing that the strategy of primary con-
trol is to “influence existing realities” and that the typical targets for causal influence in-
clude “environmental circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 69 See Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 50–60 (2010) (exploring changes in Facebook users’ 
attitudes towards privacy and behavior patterns in light of Facebook’s News Feed and 
Mini Feed features); Anna C. Squicciarini et al., CoPE:  Enabling Collaborative Privacy Man-
agement in Online Social Networks, 62 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 521, 523–28 (2011) 
(proposing a technological mechanism to support joint management of shared shared 
content among users who post content in OSNs). 
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posts, avoiding publicizing content that could be problematic, delet-
ing sensitive content (in one’s profile and/or the comments one has 
posted elsewhere), untagging photos or place check-ins, and with-
holding sensitive information.70 
Technological self-protection approaches comprise privacy-
enhancing technologies (“PETs”) that allow individuals to protect 
their privacy by directly controlling the flow of their personal infor-
mation to others.71  In the context of OSNs, to assuage user percep-
tions of privacy invasions, a number of social networking sites have 
been rolling out privacy control features that provide users with the 
means to control the disclosure, access, and use of their personal in-
formation.72  Some social networking sites even embedded the privacy 
control features into the very use of various social networking func-
tions and thus integrated privacy control as part of social networking 
functionality (e.g., creating social circles on Google+).73  With various 
features that support the functions of specifying privacy preferences 
for using different applications on the OSNs, users are able to limit 
the amount of personal information disclosed on the OSNs.  For ex-
ample, Facebook users can specify their privacy preferences on who 
can see their profiles and personal information, who can search for 
them, how they can be contacted, what stories about them get pub-
lished to their profiles, etc.  In sum, these behavioral and technologi-
cal privacy management strategies could provide users with the 
means and capabilities to control information release and limit in-
formation access by others and thus may reduce their perceptions of 
privacy risks. 
B.  Collective Privacy Management 
The second control-enhancing mechanism is comprised of tools 
and approaches that allow individuals to protect privacy as a member 
of a group by harnessing group members’ collective privacy know-
 
 70 See Airi Lampinen et al., We’re in It Together:  Interpersonal Management of Disclosure in Social 
Network Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN 
COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 3217, 3217–26 (2011) (identifying social networking site user 
concerns and exploring strategies available to users to allay and address these concerns). 
 71 Herbert Burkert, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies:  Typology, Critique, Vision, in TECHNOLOGY 
AND PRIVACY 125 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (“PETs . . . seek to elimi-
nate the use of personal data altogether or to give direct control over revelation of per-
sonal information to the person concerned.”). 
 72 See Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3221–25 (2011) (discussing privacy control strate-
gies on social networks generally). 
 73 See A Quick Look at Google+, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en-
US/+/learnmore/index.html#circles (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). 
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ledge and preferences to make informed privacy decisions together.  
When a user discloses her personal information in OSNs, the person-
al information moves to a collective domain where the user and her 
social ties become co-owners with joint responsibilities for keeping 
the information safe and private.  Collective privacy management in-
cludes interpersonal actions and decisions associated with how in-
formation privacy is maintained by a group of individuals who co-
manage that information.  It differs from individual privacy manage-
ment because of its change of agency (from the self to a group), its 
inclusion of interpersonal privacy decision making, and its co-
management of shared information.  Collective privacy management 
is seen as a process of maintaining social boundaries among many re-
lationships that often overlap and becomes a group issue when the 
actions of one individual affect the privacy of another individual. 
Prior literature on collective privacy management explores how 
different communication technologies—especially social networking 
websites—affect collective privacy boundary management among us-
ers who co-own and co-manage shared information.  This stream of 
research often highlights the tension or conflict that an individual 
user faces when creating contents that may connect with others’ iden-
tities (e.g., uploading an image about a friend, tagging a friend in an 
image, or linking to a friend’s personal profile).  Such collaborative 
activities raise a new set of privacy challenges because a person’s pri-
vate information can be easily revealed in content created by others.  
For example, a study of photo “tagging” and “untagging” on Face-
book has exposed the complexities of collective privacy management, 
the tensions of content ownership, and the effects that one user up-
loading and tagging a picture of another can have on the latter’s rela-
tionships with friends, family, employers, etc.74 
Prior privacy research on OSNs describes behavioral and technol-
ogical means for users to enact collective privacy practices for co-
managing their shared information and content.75  These collective 
privacy practices comprise strategies or tools that allow individuals 
and their social group members collectively acting as the control 
agents to exercise collective control over the flow of their shared in-
 
 74 See Andrew Besmer & Heather Richter Lipford, Moving Beyond Untagging:  Photo Privacy in 
a Tagged World, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS (CHI) 1563, 1568–71 (2010) (discussing the results of a 
study in which participants were asked to, among other things, “select a photo they did 
not want at least one other person to be able to see and untag or restrict that photograph 
on Facebook”). 
 75 Id. at 1564; see also Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3217–19 (2011) (discussing various 
prior studies regarding social network privacy concerns and technology). 
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formation.  Lampinen et al. identify behavioral strategies for users to 
collectively manage their shared information, e.g., negotiating and 
agreeing on “rules of thumb” concerning sharing with other users, 
asking for approval before disclosing content from those involved, 
and asking another person to delete content.76 
In terms of technological strategies, researchers have begun pro-
posing the PETs associated with collective privacy management.  
Technical solutions include addressing the conflicting privacy prefe-
rences among multiple content owners,77 restricting shared content 
to a selected group of contacts,78 proposing a user-centric privacy ar-
chitecture to support collaborative privacy practices,79 developing 
technical means to facilitate interactions among co-owners for co-
managing shared content,80 and promoting collaborative privacy 
awareness through facilitating a group’s social collaborations in pri-
vacy decision making.81  For instance, Besmer et al. proposed a 
friendship-based protection model which facilitates collective privacy 
management.82  In their proposed solution, when a privacy-conscious 
user makes informed decisions for himself or herself, that privacy set-
ting is in turn used to promote privacy awareness among his or her 
friends on the same network.83  In sum, this stream of research ad-
 
 76 Lampinen et al., supra note 70, at 3221–23. 
 77 See Anna C. Squicciarini et al., Collective Privacy Management in Social Networks, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB 521, 521–
22 (2009) (discussing collaborative privacy management of shared content). 
 78 See Mohammad Mannan & Paul C. van Oorschot, Privacy-Enhanced Sharing of Personal Con-
tent on the Web, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD 
WIDE WEB 487, 487–88 (2008) (discussing control mechanisms for partially restricting 
personal Web content). 
 79 See Jan Kolter et al., Collaborative Privacy Management, 29 COMPUTERS & SEC. 580, 581 
(2010) (suggesting that a “collaborative privacy community facilitates Internet users to 
share privacy-related information about service providers”). 
 80 See Squicciarini, supra note 69, at 523–28 (proposing a mechanism to support joint man-
agement of shared shared content among users who post content in OSNs). 
 81 See Andrew Besmer et al., Social Applications:  Exploring A More Secure Framework, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2009) (seeking 
to improve the current access control model used by application platforms so that protec-
tion is provided while still allowing desirable information access). 
 82 Id. at 3. 
 83 Taking the example from Besmer et al.’s work to illustrate their friendship-based solu-
tion:  Bob (the target) is a careless user who does not pay close attention to protecting his 
profile privacy and leaves his default application policy to be very permissive.  Alice (the 
viewer) is Bob’s friend, and she installed a horoscope application which is not installed by 
Bob.  Alice is security conscious and she set up her application policy to allow access to 
only the birth date attributes.  The application will now only be able to access Bob’s birth 
date when requested by Alice, and nothing more.  Alice’s awareness does not only protect 
her but it also protects Bob’s profile due to the fact that Alice’s policy is incorporated 
when the application attempts to access Bob’s profile.  Id. 
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dresses the interactional and collective aspects of privacy manage-
ment, which could provide users with the means and capabilities to 
control information release and limit information access in a collec-
tive fashion, and thus may reduce their collective concerns for infor-
mation privacy. 
C.  Proxy Privacy Management 
When exercise of personal control is neither readily available nor 
encouraged, people might well relinquish their direct control prefe-
rences and seek “security in proxy control.”84  Proxy control is an at-
tempt to align oneself with a powerful force in order to gain control 
through powerful others when people “do not have enough skills, 
knowledge, and power to bring about their desired outcome or avoid 
an undesired outcome in the environment . . . .”85  In the privacy con-
text, when users perceive that they lack the resources to directly con-
trol their personal information, they may reshape their decisions on 
information disclosure by considering the role of powerful others 
(e.g., legislators) who can act on their privacy benefits.86  The third 
mechanism refers to proxy privacy management where powerful 
forces (i.e., legislators or industry self-regulators) act as the control 
agents for individuals to exercise proxy control over their personal 
information. 
Prior privacy research describes two types of proxy privacy man-
agement:  industry self-regulation and government regulation.87  Industry 
self-regulation is a commonly used approach that consists of industry 
codes and self-policing trade groups and associations (e.g., Direct 
Marketing Association) as a means of regulating privacy practices.  
Seals of approval such as TRUSTe or certifications are other exam-
ples of mechanisms that are designed to confirm adequate privacy 
compliance.88  Violation of the codes of conduct can mean revocation 
of the privacy seal, or referral to the law authority such as the appro-
 
 84 Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 122, 142 
(1982); Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 Yamaguchi, supra note 59, at 228–29. 
 86 See Heng Xu & Hock-Hai Teo, Alleviating Consumers’ Privacy Concerns in Location-Based Ser-
vices:  A Psychological Control Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH ANNUAL 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMATION SYSTEMS 793, 797 (2004) (discussing the 
effects of proxy control in the context of location-based services (“LBS”):  “when people 
perceive that they lack the requisite resources to directly control their personal informa-
tion disclosed for LBS transactions, they may reshape their decision on using LBS by con-
sidering the availability of powerful others who can be induced to act for their benefit”). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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priate attorney general’s office or the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”).89 
In the privacy literature, the presence of privacy seals have been 
found to have a positive effect on the perception of trust in a compa-
ny,90 resulting in more favorable perceptions toward the privacy 
statement.91  However, a number of recent studies uncovered insuffi-
cient enforcement power by third-party certification agencies to en-
sure firms act according to their privacy policies.  Miyazaki and 
Krishnamurthy reviewed sixty high-traffic websites and found no sup-
port for the hypothesis that participation in a seal program is an indi-
cator of better privacy practices.92 
Government regulation is another mechanism that relies on the 
judicial and legislative branches of a government to set and enact 
laws for privacy protection.93  The privacy protection standards set by 
the government enable individuals to believe that firms will protect 
privacy post-contractually, thereby providing individuals with a sense 
of control over their personal information.94  Milberg, Smith, and 
Burke conducted a survey of 595 internal auditors of the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (“ISACA”) from nineteen dif-
ferent countries and suggested that, when corporations exhibit loose 
management of information privacy, and/or when individual privacy 
concerns rise, individuals are more inclined to prefer government in-
 
 89 Paola Benassi, TRUSTe:  An Online Privacy Seal Program, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1999, at 56, 58–
59. 
 90 Nora J. Rifon et al., Your Privacy Is Sealed:  Effects of Web Privacy Seals on Trust and Personal 
Disclosures, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 339, 340 (2005) (“Partipants had more favorable percep-
tions of privacy policies at Web sites that displayed seals . . . .”). 
 91 Anthony D. Miyazaki & Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Internet Seals of Approval:  Effects on Online 
Privacy Policies and Consumer Perceptions, 36 J. CONSUMER AFF. 28, 42 (2002) (suggesting the 
“presence of the Internet seal of approval logo was shown to raise consumer perceptions 
of the favorableness of a firm’s privacy-related practices”). 
 92 Id. at 36–37; see also Robert LaRose & Nora Rifon, Your Privacy is Assured—of Being Dis-
turbed:  Websites With and Without Privacy Seals, 8 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1009, 1023 (2006) 
(noting the irony that some studied websites which “publicize[d] their concern for con-
sumer privacy by displaying privacy seals were actually more likely to infringe upon their 
visitors’ privacy”). 
 93 Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Person-
al Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 3–19 (William 
Daley & Larry Irving eds., 1997) (outlining possible alternatives for protection of personal 
information). 
 94 Zhulei Tang et al., Gaining Trust Through Online Privacy Protection:  Self-Regulation, Mandato-
ry Standards, or Caveat Emptor, 24 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153, 159 (2008) (arguing caveat 
emptor, combined with government regulation of deceitful claims, will succeed in in-
creasing privacy protection). 
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tervention and be distrustful of firm self-regulation.95  At the society 
level, Tang et al. indicate that, although legislations can generally 
enhance consumer trust, government interventions may not be so-
cially optimal in all situations because of lower revenue margins for 
companies and higher costs for consumers.96  Thus, promoting indi-
vidual and collective privacy management strategies in the context of 
OSNs might be increasingly perceived as a viable substitute for proxy 
privacy management approach because of the flexibility to cross in-
ternational and regulatory boundaries. 
V.  IMPACTS OF TRUST 
A.  Trust in Providers of OSNs 
The conceptual academic literature in consumer privacy indicates 
that the Integrative Social Contract Theory (“ISCT”)97 is particularly 
appropriate for understanding the tensions between firms and con-
sumers over information privacy.98  According to this ISCT perspec-
tive, “[a] social contract is initiated, therefore, when there are expec-
tations of social norms (i.e., generally understood obligations) that 
govern the behavior of those involved.”99  When consumers provide 
personal information to a company and the company in turn offers 
some benefits to the consumer, one generally understood obligation 
accruing from entering into this social contract is that the firm will 
 
 95 Sandra J. Milberg et al., Information Privacy:  Corporate Management and National Regula-
tion, 11 ORG. SCI. 35, 42–47 (2000) (“[I]f corporations exhibit loose management of in-
formation privacy, then individuals are more likely to call for strong privacy laws rather 
than allowing corporations to self-regulate . . . .”). 
 96 Tang et al., supra note 94, 154–68 (suggesting government regulation is more effective 
but less efficient and not optimal for society). 
 97 THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND:  A SOCIAL CONTRACTS 
APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) (explaining the Integrative Social Contract 
Theory). 
 98 Eve M. Caudill & Patrick E. Murphy, Consumer Online Privacy:  Legal and Ethical Issues, 19 J. 
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 7, 8, 12 (2000) (“[C]onsumers have varying degrees of concern 
with privacy and place different values on their personal information” and “businesses do 
not always compete with consumers’ best interests in mind.”); Mary J. Culnan, Consumer 
Awareness of Name Removal Procedures:  Implications for Direct Marketing, J. DIRECT 
MARKETING, Spring 1995, at 10, 11 (“Integrative social contact theory (ICST) provides a 
means for understanding the current tensions between marketers and consumers over 
privacy.”); Milne & Gordon, supra note 44, at 212–14 (evaluating proposals to protect 
personal information of customers in direct mailing). 
 99 Caudill & Murphy, supra note 98,  at 14. 
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undertake the responsibility to manage consumers’ personal infor-
mation properly.100   
This [implied social] contract is considered breached if consumers are 
unaware information is being collected, if the marketer rents the con-
sumer’s personal information to a third party without permission, or if 
consumers are not given an opportunity to remove their names from lists 
or otherwise restrict the dissemination of personal data about them,101  
or their information is being shared, or their information is being 
used for other purposes.102 
Thus, the social contract on information collection and use re-
quires consumers’ trust on the company’s compliance with this social 
contract.103  In the context of OSNs, because of the absence of assur-
ances that the OSN providers will not engage in opportunistic beha-
viors in terms of information misuse, trust in an OSN provider is cru-
cial in helping users overcome their perceptions of uncertainty.  If 
the OSN provider is perceived to be caring about users’ information 
privacy needs (perceptions of the “benevolence” of the provider), 
honest and consistent in its dealing with users’ personal information 
(perceptions of the “integrity” of the provider), and capable of pro-
 
100 Id.; see also Culnan, supra note 98, at 11 (“When direct marketing is viewed as an implied 
social contract, consumers provide personal information in exchange for receiving solici-
tations and other information, based on an expectation that their personal information 
will be managed responsibly.”); George R. Milne, Consumer Participation in Mailing Lists:  A 
Field Experiment, 16 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 298, 298, 301 (1997) (“[A] social contract 
occurs when a customer provides a marketer with personal information at the point of 
purchase with the intention that the marketer will use this information to serve the cus-
tomer better” and “a consumer’s control over his or her personal information is a fun-
damental component of a fair implied social contract.”); Milne & Gordon, supra note 44, 
at 207 (“To enter a social contractual relationship with an organization . . . consumers 
must perceive that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”); Phelps et al., supra note 
15, at 29 (“[M]arketers should view consumers’ exchange of information as an implied 
social contract.” (citations omitted)). 
101 Phelps et al., supra note 15, at 29. 
102 Culnan, supra note 98, at 11–12 (“[I]f a marketer’s practices do not reflect ‘knowledge, 
notice, and no,’ the result may be viewed as a consumer information problem.”); 
Milne, supra note 100, at 298 (“If the marketer, however, rents the customer’s personal 
information to a third party without permission, and the third party sends the customer 
unwanted solicitations, this could be a breach of the implied social contract.”). 
103 Caudill & Murphy, supra note 98, at 14–15 (discussing social contract theory in the con-
text of direct marketing on the Internet); Culnan & Bies, supra note 40, at 327 
(“[C]reating willingness in consumers to disclose personal information requires that the 
second exchange be based on a fair social contract.  Developing information practices 
that address the perceived risk of disclosure should result in positive experiences with the 
organization over time, increasing the consumer’s perceptions that the organization can 
be trusted.” (citations omitted)); Donna L. Hoffman et al., Information Privacy in the Mar-
ketspace:  Implications for the Commercial Uses of Anonymity on the Web, 15 INFO. SOC’Y 129, 133 
(1999) (comparing social exchange to economic exchange and asserting that social ex-
change tends to invoke feelings of trust). 
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tecting their personal information (perceptions of the “competence” 
of the provider), the level of concern over information privacy may 
be reduced.104 
An OSN provider’s interventions with regard to joining privacy 
seal programs and introducing privacy-enhancing features, therefore, 
should directly build users’ trusting beliefs toward the OSN provider 
because of the nontrivial investment of time and resources made by 
the OSN provider to design, develop, and implement these privacy-
enhancing initiatives.  These actions should be interpreted as a signal 
that the OSN provider is actively addressing users’ privacy concerns 
and will comply with the social contract by undertaking the responsi-
bility to manage users’ personal information properly.  In other 
words, a particular OSN provider’s privacy interventions (e.g., intro-
duction of the privacy enhancing features and joining privacy seal 
programs) may increase users’ trusting beliefs in an OSN provider. 
B.  Trust in Social Ties 
Besides trust in the OSN provider (e.g., Facebook), Hoadley et. al 
also highlight the importance of trust in social ties (e.g., “friends,” 
“friends of friends” on Facebook, and the university’s Facebook us-
ers) in their case analysis of the Facebook News Feed privacy outcry.105  
When a user discloses her personal information in OSNs, the person-
al information moves to a collective domain where the user and her 
friends in OSNs become co-owners with joint responsibilities for 
keeping the information safe and private.106  Individuals/friends on 
the user’s contact list usually have a certain amount of information 
access to the user’s profile and personal information may be misused 
if the relationship changes.  In addition, it has been recently reported 
that personal details of Facebook users could potentially be breached 
due to their friends adding applications.107  That is to say, even if 
 
104 D. Harrison McKnight et al., The Impact of Initial Consumer Trust on Intentions to Transact 
with a Web Site:  A Trust Building Model, 11 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 297, 303 (2002) (foot-
note omitted) (defining “trusting beliefs” as “integrity (trustee honesty and promise keep-
ing), benevolence (trustee caring and motivation to act in the trustor’s interests), compe-
tence (ability of the trustee to do what the trustor needs), and predictability (consistency 
of trustee behavior)”). 
105 See generally Hoadley et al., supra note 4, at 58 (noting the “importance of perceived control 
and ease of information access in alleviating users’ privacy concerns . . .”). 
106 SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY 10 (2002) (“When we are told private infor-
mation by others, we enter into a contract of responsibility to be co-owners of the infor-
mation.”). 
107 Wang et al., supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting “the ability for an application to gather infor-
mation about one’s friends should be another issue to be addressed. . . . If the user is not 
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some users think they have tight privacy and security settings, their 
personal information could be accessed and used by third-party ap-
plications due to their friends’ ignorance of privacy and security.108  
The need for trust in social ties arises due to the inability to monitor 
other members on the network and uncertainty about their beha-
viors.  Trust in social ties, therefore, could be an effective mechanism 
to reduce the complexity of human conduct in situations where 
people have to cope with uncertainty.109  Such trusting belief in social 
ties may enable users to perceive that their personal information will 
be co-managed appropriately by their “friends.” 
VI.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Although terms such as “invasion of privacy” and/or “privacy 
breach” have been considerably hyped in the media, conceptualiza-
tions of information privacy in the context of OSNs have been some-
what patchy.  In the privacy literature, there are some difficulties in 
identifying common ground of information privacy, and this chal-
lenge will likely become more pronounced in the next few years.  Ac-
cording to a 2007 study sponsored by the National Research Council, 
the relationship between information privacy and society is now un-
der pressure due to several factors that are “changing and expanding 
in scale with unprecedented speed in terms of our ability to under-
stand and contend with their implications to our world, in general, 
and our privacy, in particular.”110  Factors related to technological 
change (e.g., cloud computing) and to societal trends (e.g., globaliza-
tion and cross-border data flow) are combining to force a reconside-
ration of basic privacy concepts and their implications.111  Therefore, 
rather than drawing on a single theoretical lens, this Article builds 
upon previous literature from multiple theoretical lenses to create a 
common understanding of Privacy 2.0 in the context of OSNs.  A 
theoretical framework was proposed to synthesize results of prior pri-
vacy studies, and to outline major research issues (see infra Figure 1). 
 
diligent about setting secure privacy settings, the apps may be able to access his/her 
friends’ information.”). 
108 Id. 
109 Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust:  Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST 94, 97 
(Diego  Gambetta ed., 1988) (“Trust . . . presupposes a situation of risk. . . . You can avoid 
taking the risk, but only if you are willing to waive the associated advantages.  You do not 
depend on trusting relations in the same way you depend on confidence, but trust too 
can be a matter of routine and normal behaviour.”). 
110 COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, supra note 20, at 27. 
111 Id. at 28 (presenting a chart summarizing large-scale factors affecting privacy). 
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FIGURE 1  












The proposed framework integrates the control agency theory 
and identifies three privacy management strategies by linking them 
with different types of control agencies:  individual, proxy, and collec-
tive privacy management in the context of OSNs.  Exploration of the 
influences and outcomes of users’ perceived privacy is particularly 
important in discussing the effectiveness of privacy management 
strategies, as these are often confused in technical design, OSN pro-
viders’ data collection practices, and users’ privacy expectations.  This 
Article argues that an individual’s perceived privacy is better viewed 
as perceived control over information release and perceived ease of 
information access, with the considerations of optimistic bias.  Due to 
the effect of optimistic bias, users would tend to magnify the degree 
of control involved in the release of their personal information, while 
they often underestimate the degree of information access by others.  
The impact of optimistic bias on risk perceptions of information dis-
closure should also not be discounted.  Users on OSNs tend to dem-
onstrate a tendency to believe that their risk levels are lower than that 
of their peers. 
According to the calculus lens of privacy, individuals can be ex-
pected to be rational in dealing with information sharing.  Rationality 
dictates that users will reveal their personal information as long as 
they perceive benefits will exceed the risks of information disclosure.  
The theoretical lens of privacy calculus highlights the importance of 
risk appraisal and benefit calculation in an individual’s information 
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disclosure behavior.  However, according to the economics literature, 
human agents are unable to have absolute rationality because of the 
potential impacts of information processing capacity limitations and 
psychological distortions on individual decision making.  Users may 
genuinely want to protect their personal data, but because of 
bounded rationality, rather than carefully calculating long-term risks 
of information disclosure, they may opt for immediate gratification 
instead. 
Other rational factors such as trust and information sensitivity 
should also be considered as important determinants of information 
withholding and information disclosure.  Complete information dis-
closure can be expected when users trust the organization’s benevo-
lence, integrity, and competence to protect their information.  It has 
been suggested in the privacy literature that information sensitivity 
(i.e., the type of personal information requested by an organization) 
could also influence users’ decisions to withhold or disclose their per-
sonal information.112  Information such as financial data, medical 
records, and personal identifiers (e.g., social security numbers) was 
found to be much more sensitive than demographic characteristics, 
purchase behavior, and lifestyle habits.113 
In conclusion, the main contribution of this Article is the genera-
tion of a privacy conceptual framework in the domain of OSNs, with 
rich grounding in a range of multidisciplinary privacy literatures in 
behavioral sciences, information systems, public policy, and social 
psychology.  Privacy researchers who are interested in the domain of 
OSNs are likely to benefit from the theoretical framework proposed 
in this Article.  It identifies the factors affecting users’ decisions to 
withhold and disclose information and how their privacy decision 
making is influenced by these factors.  Presenting a multidisciplinary 
synthesis, the framework developed in this Article should be of inter-
est to academic researchers, providers of OSNs, legislators, industry 
self-regulators, and designers of privacy-enhancing technologies. 
 
112 Malhotra et al., supra note 56,  at 342 (“It is known that consumers’ reactions to privacy 
threats depend on the type of information requested by marketers.  All things being 
equal, releasing more sensitive information is perceived as more risky than releasing less 
sensitive information.” (citations omitted)); Phelps et al., supra note 15, at 27 (consider-
ing the “types of personal information consumers are most and least willing to provide to 
direct marketers and other retailers”). 
113 Id. at 38 (“Consumers are least willing to provide financial and personal identifier infor-
mation . . . . [M]ost respondents were willing to provide demographic, media, and life-
style information . . . .”). 
